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ABSTRACT
Poor and uneducated patients may not know what health care is desirable and, if
fully insured, have little incentive to minimize the costs of their care. Partly in response to these
concerns, most states have moved a substantial portion of their Medicaid caseloads out of
traditional competitive fee-for-service (FFS) care, and into mandatory managed care (MMC)
plans that severely restrict the choice of provider. 
We use a unique longitudinal data base of California births in order to examine the
impact of this policy on pregnant women and infants. California phased in MMC creating
variation in the timing of MMC. We identify the effects of MMC using changes in the regime
faced by individual mothers between births. Some counties adopted single-carrier plans, while
others adopted regimes with at least two carriers. Hence, we also ask whether competition
between at least two carriers improved MMC outcomes. We find that MMC reduced the quality
of prenatal care and increased low birth weight, prematurity, and neonatal death. Our results
suggest that the competitive FFS system provided better care than the new MMC system, and
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moretti@econ.ucla.edu1 For example, many chapters in the Handbook of Health Economics (Culyer and
Newhouse, 2000) deal with this issue, and Glied (2000) discusses it in the context of managed
care organizations.
2 In this way, Medicaid patients became more similar to the majority of the privately
insured, who had already become subject to managed care–by 1992, about 70% of the privately
insured were already in managed care plans (Glied, 2000).
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There is a vast literature focusing on imperfections in the market for health care.
1  In the
case of public health insurance for the indigent, it has been argued that poor and uneducated
patients may be even less likely than others to know what health care is really desirable, and that
if these patients are fully insured by public plans, then they will have little incentive to minimize
the costs of their medical care.  Hence, poor people were thought to be easy marks for shady
providers who billed government for many services of dubious quality (e.g. “Medicaid Mills”);
were more likely than others to use high cost providers such as emergency rooms rather than
lower cost providers such as doctors’ offices; and were less likely than others to receive
preventive care.   
  In the U.S., Medicaid is the main public health insurance program for low income women
and children.  Over the 1990s, most states moved a substantial portion of their Medicaid
caseloads out of traditional competitive fee-for-service (FFS) care, and into mandatory managed
care (MMC) plans.
2  State governments argued that this change would improve access to care,
and the quality of care for Medicaid patients, by linking patients to approved providers.   In
contrast to FFS, in which patients may chose any provider willing to serve them, MMC plans
typically severely restrict the choice of provider, and pay the provider(s) a fixed (capitated) fee
per patient.  
This feature of  MMC removed Medicaid providers from the discipline of the market by2
giving them a largely captive patient base.  Patient advocates point out that in contrast to FFS
providers, capitated MMC plans have incentives to minimize costs by providing as little care as
possible, and by discouraging the sickest patients from enrolling in the plans.  These are the
same concerns that have been expressed with respect to privately enrolled patients in  managed
care plans.  
In this paper, we use a unique longitudinal data base of California births in order to
examine the impact of switching from a competitive FFS system to MMC on the utilization of
care and outcomes among the disadvantaged pregnant women who became subject to MMC. 
This file is formed by using the confidential birth records to link mothers between births.
Beginning in 1994, California phased in MMC on a county-by-county basis, creating a great deal
of variation in the timing of MMC which we exploit.  We control for individual heterogeneity
using mother fixed effects and identify the effects of the different plans by focusing on changes
in the Medicaid regime faced by a mother between births.  This strategy allows us to overcome
one of the key weaknesses of earlier studies, which is that Medicaid mothers may differ from
other mothers in unobserved ways, and that MMC may change the way that mothers are selected
into the Medicaid program. 
A second feature of California’s MMC implementation is that while some counties
adopted a single-insurance-carrier plan, the state mandated that others adopt regimes with at
least two carriers.   It was thought that mandating at least two competing plans would help to
assure quality by allowing patients unhappy with one plan to “vote with the feet” and move to
the other plan.   We therefore ask whether mandating the participation of more than one carrier
improved MMC outcomes.     3
In contrast to previous examinations of MMC which have found some evidence of effects
on health care utilization but little evidence of effects on health outcomes, we find that MMC
plans were associated with reductions in the quality of  prenatal care and increases in low birth
weight, prematurity, and neonatal death relative to FFS Medicaid.    The difference in results
may be due to the fact that our study design overcomes many of the limitations of previous work. 
By following the same mothers over time and examining changes in the enrollment patterns,
utilization of care, and birth outcomes of mothers who became subject to different types of
MMC, we are better able to isolate the effects of these plans.   By focusing on the population that
was actually subject to MMC, we avoid drawing inferences about its effects from the
experiences of the large numbers of women who were not required to enroll.   And by merging
data from several sources, we are able to examine a wide range of outcomes, and to judge
whether the estimated effects are consistent across these outcomes.
Our estimates are robust to several changes in specification including: a “regression
discontinuity” design in which we focus only on women who had a birth in the three years before
or after a change in MMC; an “intent-to-treat” design in which we assign MMC status based on
the state’s original plan for each county (disregarding changes in MMC which were not in the
state plan); controlling for the endogeneity of location by assigning MMC status to each women
based on the first county in which she is observed only; and including both both county-specific
time trends and time trends interacted with the mother’s demographic characteristics.  We also
show that while MMC has strong effects on the target group, it had no effect on other similar
groups who were not subject to MMC.
   Our results suggest that despite its well-documented failings, the old, competitive, fee-3 Tai-Seale et al. (2001) find that these two counties had lower utilization of prenatal
care, and a higher number of one-day stays compared to a third county with FFS care.
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for-service system with many atomistic providers of Medi-Cal services provided care that was
better in many respects than either MMC system.  Moreover attempts to mandate a degree of
competition by requiring the participation of at least two plans did little to improve matters.   
Ultimately, it appears that these poor, uneducated women did a better job of navigating the FFS
health care system than the government was able to do for them. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides background about the
implementation of MMC in California.  Section 2 describes our data sources, and section 3 lays
out our methods.  Results are discussed in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
1. Background
a) The Implementation of Medicaid Managed Care in California
Until 1994,  the vast majority of California’s Medicaid recipients were in fee-for-service
plans in which recipients could choose any provider who would accept them, and providers
would then seek reimbursement from Medi-Cal, California’s Medicaid agency.   Several
counties had managed care plans available to Medi-Cal recipients on a voluntary basis, but
enrollments in these plans were very small.  Although two California counties (Santa Barbara
and San Mateo) were allowed to implement experimental mandatory MMC plans, it was not
until the early 1990s that the state made definitive moves in this direction.
3  It was first necessary
to pass state enabling legislation, and to obtain a waiver of the federal government’s requirement
that Medicaid patients be allowed a choice of providers.  4 Three small experimental managed care programs have been excluded from our
analysis,  Prepaid Health Plans, Primary Care Case Management, and Fee-For-Service Managed
Care.  In June 2001, these accounted for .02%, .01%, and .73% of all Medi-Cal beneficiaries. 
The first two are voluntary managed care plans, while the last is a FFS plan in which the state
contractor acts as a care-coordinator and gate-keeper.
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MMC was adopted according to The Department of Health Services’ Plan for Expanding
Medi-Cal Managed Care (DHS, 1993).   In the cover letter to this document, the director of the
Department of Health Services, Molly Joel Coye,  laid out the case for an expansion of
mandatory managed care in California as follows:
“The care our patients receive is fragmented, patchwork, and out-dated.  Instead of being cared
for in a doctor’s office or a clinic, our patients wind up waiting hours in emergency rooms for
simple problems like a child’s ear infection.  Thousands of Medi-Cal beneficiaries are
hospitalized each year for serious health conditions that could have been prevented by primary
care...There is an alternative that makes sense: organized health care...Because the state is in
such a severe budget crisis, many people assume that we are speeding up the transition to
managed care in order to save money.  But the purpose of our accelerated transition–designed to
double managed care enrollments by April 1995 and to take nearly half of all Medi-Cal
beneficiaries into managed care arrangements by the year 1996–is to improve quality and
access” (Coye, 1993).
Whether the impetus for the expansion was cost savings or improving access to care, it seems
clear that the primary impetus for the change came from the state rather than from individual
counties.   
Three main models of MMC are discussed in the planning document: the County
Organized Health System (COHS); the Two-Plan Model; and the Geographic Managed Care
(GMC) model.
4   In a COHS county, there is one public, county-run Medicaid managed care
plan, and people who are required to enroll in managed care must enroll in that plan if they wish
to receive Medicaid services.   In a Two-Plan County, there is a county-managed plan and a
private managed care plan that has a contractual arrangement with the county to accept Medicaid6
patients.   People required to enroll in managed care must choose between the two plans. 
Finally, in a GMC county, there is no public, county-managed plan; the county contracts with
different private managed care organizations to provide services to the Medicaid caseload.  All
private plans involved in MMC are selected by competitive bidding, and must offer a minimum
bundle of services.
The planning document specified that 13 of California’s 58 counties would adopt MMC
using the Two-Plan model, a further three counties (Orange, Santa Cruz and Solano) would
adopt the COHS, and that GMC would be implemented in Sacramento.   The main criteria for
determining which counties would get which plan were the county’s population (there had to be
a minimum of 45,000 Medi-Cal beneficiaries) and the extent of private managed care infra-
structure that already existed in the county at the time of the planning document.   Given the
small number of counties with GMC plans, we will look at Two Plan and GMC counties together
in what follows.
The state plan inspired a great deal of controversy about what type of plan would best
serve Medi-Cal recipients and other indigents.  The state favored the Two-Plan model, which is
why it mandated that it be adopted in most MMC counties.  The state held that competition
between plans would offer patients choice and assure quality.   However, in federal
Congressional hearings held to discuss the state’s plans, many stakeholders expressed
reservations (Committee on Energy and Commerce, 1994).
It was feared that commercial plans would place new burdens on safety net providers by
identifying the low-cost patients and leaving the rest for the safety net to serve, and by denying
services to people so that they ended up in emergency rooms.   For example, Michele Melden, an5 Some delay may have been difficult for counties to avoid.  For example, Los Angeles
county began planning to set up their Two-Plan model in February 1993, before the state plan
had even been officially released.   In Sept. 1994, the governor signed legislation enabling the
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attorney with the National Health Law Program discussed one managed care organization that
routinely “emergency disenrolled” members who were brought into the San Bernardino trauma
unit, with the disenrollment being effective the date of injury (Committee on Energy and
Commerce, page 44).
Witnesses also raised the possibility that diverting paying Medi-Cal patients from
traditional safety-net  providers to private plans would reduce the ability of these providers to
care for non-paying, indigent patients, and that it would threaten the “disproportionate share”
payments that these providers received from the federal government.  One study in Sacramento
found that community clinics experienced 40 to 45 percent declines in usage after the
introduction of MMC (Korenbrot, Miller and Green, 1998).
   In the end, events unfolded according to the state’s plan: 12 of the 13  counties
designated to adopt the Two-Plan model did so (San Diego eventually adopted the GMC model
instead but in what follows we treat Two-Plan and GMC similarly).  The three counties
earmarked for COHS adopted it, as did two other counties, Napa and Monterey.  (Yolo county
also adopted COHS, but after our sample period).   By June 2001, some 2.8 million people, half
of those enrolled in Medi-Cal, were in managed care (Klein and Donaldson, 2002).  Moreover,
while counties had been asked to have their new plans in place by April 1996 at the latest, 15 of
the 17 originally designated counties had implemented a plan by April 1997 (the two laggards
were San Diego and Tulare).  In general then, it appears that counties cooperated remarkably
closely with the master plan that had been laid out by the state.
5   creation of the county-managed plan.  Creation of the plan was completed by Dec. 1995 and it
was licensed to serve Medi-Cal eligibles in April 1997.  However, it did not receive permission
from the Health Care Financing Administration to move FFS beneficiaries into managed care
until Sept. 1997 (www.lacare.org/ lacare/lacare01.nsf/0/9ef4e855697f82f68825688d005a4fb1?
OpenDocument). 
6 Currie and Gruber (1996) discuss extensions of Medicaid eligibility to pregnant women
who were not on cash assistance over the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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Table 1 lists the counties that adopted MMC, the type of plan that they adopted, the date
at which enrollment began, the fraction of the caseload enrolled in a privately-run plan as of July
2000, the size of the county as proxied by the number of births in 2000, and median household
income in the county.    
Table 1 shows that the counties that adopted MMC were much larger on average than
those that did not, as one would expect given the rationale for selecting counties given in the
state plan.   COHS counties were somewhat wealthier than Two Plan/GMC counties, which in
turn were wealthier than those that did not adopt.  These differences suggest that it will be
important to control for heterogeneity when examining the effects of MMC adoption on
outcomes.  Table 1 also shows that in a typical Two Plan county, between 20 to 40 percent of the
caseload was enrolled in a private plan, so that the private plans were important, and might have
been expected to provide some competition for the publicly run plans.  
It is however, very important to note that some categories of pregnant women are not
required to join managed care plans.  The most important exceptions for our purposes are
pregnant women eligible for Medicaid only because their incomes are above the threshold for
cash welfare, but less than 200 percent of poverty, and undocumented pregnant women.
6   In
2000, 11.6% of Medi-Cal deliveries were of women in the first category, while 38.9% of7 It is unfortunate that we also lose foreign-born women who are legal residents, but it is
impossible to determine from the data who is legal and who is not.  Moreover, among foreign-
born women language and culture may create additional barriers to care, and the growth in the
undocumented category raises the possibility that foreign-born women who were otherwise
ineligible for Medi-Cal presented themselves as undocumented in order to gain access to these
services.
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California Medicaid deliveries were of undocumented women (Rains, 2000).   In general,
women who were only eligible for Medi-Cal because they were pregnant, and who were only
eligible for coverage of prenatal care and delivery, were not required to join managed care
organizations.
In order to focus on women likely to be subject to MMC, we restrict our analysis sample
to unmarried native-born women with a high school education or less.    These criteria remove
the undocumented (who by definition are foreign-born) and also remove the better-educated
and/or married women who are likely to be eligible only because of the income criteria.
7  By
focusing on this disadvantaged population, we can also ask whether there were spillover effects
of MMC on other disadvantaged women in Two-Plan counties, as critics of the scheme feared.
b) Possible Effects of Medicaid Managed Care
Under a traditional FFS plan, a provider receives payment for every service rendered.   
Hence, provided that reimbursements are set high enough to make the provision of services
profitable, the provider will have an incentive to provide as many services as the patient will
accept.   The main feature of an MMC plan is that the plan receives a fixed payment for each
patient.  Thus, at any point in time, the plan has an incentive to provide as few services as
possible, though to the extent that they are responsible for the same patient over time, they may8 Currie and Fahr (forthcoming) show for example, that black and Hispanic children were
less likely to be enrolled in Medicaid following the introduction of MMC in California, which
may reflect the fact that many were able to take advantage of a well-developed network of
indigent care services instead.  As discussed below, we find that black women were more likely
to be enrolled, and Hispanic women less likely to be enrolled after the implementation of MMC,
which seems less consistent with cream-skimming arguments (Hispanic babies tend to be
healthier than other babies of similar socio-economic status) than with consumer preferences.
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also have an incentive to insure that patients receive effective preventive care.   Plans receiving
capitated payments also have a clear incentive to “dump” or “cream skim”.  That is, to
discourage people who are likely to be costly patients from enrolling and instead target those
who are likely to be inexpensive.   Arlen and MacLeod (2003) point out that a third reason why
managed care organizations may provide substandard care is that the organization is not liable
for errors made by affiliated physicians; only the individual physician is liable.
These features of managed care may also make managed care less attractive to patients,
especially to those most likely to incur large medical expenses.   If plans have incentives to avoid
serving sick patients, then sick patients have incentives to steer clear of these plans.   Hence, one
might expect the Medicaid caseload to change after the introduction of managed care,  to the
extent that patients are able to choose between Medicaid and other options.
8   
It is not clear a priori how increasing the degree of competition between MMC plans is
likely to affect outcomes for those who remain enrolled in Medicaid.  To the extent that patients
who are dissatisfied with their plan have the option to switch plans without losing Medicaid
services, competition may help to ensure that the package of services offered does not fall below
some minimum level.  On the other hand, in a single plan system, it may be more difficult to
discourage high-cost patients from enrolling than in a system in which patients can be
encouraged to move to another plan.  9 For example, Levinson and Ullman (1998) analyze a cross section from three Wisconsin
counties and find that MMC increases both the utilization of prenatal care and birth weight
compared to FFS.   Moreno (1999) examined prenatal care and outcomes in Tennesee before and
after the implementation of managed care, and find declines in some measures of prenatal care
utilization, but there is no control group.  Conover, Rankin and Sloan (2001) re-examine the
impact of managed care in Tennessee using North Carolina as a control group and conclude that
MMC may have reduced the utilization of high tech procedures without affecting outcomes. 
Other studies which suffer from similar limitations, and come to similarly mixed conclusions
include Krieger et al. (1992), Goldfarb, Hillman, and Eisenberg (1991), Carey, Weis, and Homer
(1991), Oleske, Brana and Schmidt (1998), and Griffin (1999).  Sommers, Kenney and Dubay
(2002) and Kenney, Sommers and Dubay (2003) use difference-in-difference methods to
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And it is not certain that a public MMC plan run by the county would behave differently
than a privately managed plan.  There is a large literature on the differences between non-profit
and for-profit organizations which highlights the fact that they may have somewhat different
objectives; at the same time, both may be subject to similar market forces (c.f. Sloan, 2000). 
Given the complexity of the problem, it seems that only an empirical test can answer the
questions of how the introduction of MMC affected patients, and whether mandating competition
between MMC plans benefits patients.
c) Previous Examinations of the Effects of Medicaid Managed Care
Kaestner, Dubay, and Kenney (2002) provide an overview of the literature on the effects
of MMC on the utilization of care and on health.  They point out that most of the previous
literature deals with effects on utilization of care rather than health outcomes, and that even the
conclusions regarding utilization are mixed.  Infants are the one group for whom there has been
an attempt to link MMC to health outcomes, but the evidence here too is mixed, clouded by
difficulties in controlling for potentially important unobserved characteristics of the women in
MMC plans.
9examine MMC in Missouri and Ohio respectively, while Kaestner, Dubay and Kenney (2002)
examine a national sample drawn from the Vital Statistics Detail Natality files, and look at
whether being in a county with a MMC plan affects birth outcomes.   These three studies
generally find little effect on birth outcomes, though the Ohio studies finds a positive impact on
prenatal care.
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The study most closely related to the present work also examines the impact of MMC
implementation on pregnant women in California.   Baker, Schmitt, and Phibbs (2003) use
Medicaid claims data to examine the impact of the introduction of MMC on utilization of care,
costs, and outcomes.  They therefore focus only on Medicaid mothers, and do not examine
possible effects of MMC on the selection of mothers into Medicaid.  This may be an important
omission in view of evidence that women may decline to take up private health insurance
coverage available through their employment in order to use Medicaid (Cutler and Gruber,
1996); and that many women eligible for Medicaid coverage of their pregnancies do not take up
the coverage until relatively late in pregnancy (Ellwood and Kenney, 1995).    It is also of
interest to ask how MMC may have affected other low-income mothers.  Baker et al. do not
distinguish between types of MMC, and so do not ask whether the degree of competition makes
a difference.    However, the most important limitation of this study may be that they use the
fraction of 15 to 44 year old Medi-Cal women who are in enrolled in managed care as the key
independent variable measuring the effect of MMC.   This variable includes women on Medi-Cal
who were not pregnant (e.g. welfare recipients and the disabled), and does not adjust for the fact
that many pregnant Medi-Cal recipients were not required to enroll in managed care, as
discussed above.  In Orange county in 2000, Baker et al. report that 75% of Medi-Cal women
15-44 were in MMC; however, in the same year, only 27% of deliveries were in aid categories
subject to MMC (Rains, 2000). 13
Given the growing share of  Medi-Cal deliveries accounted for by undocumented women,
the fraction of Medi-Cal deliveries subject to MMC often actually moves in the opposite
direction to the fraction of all 15 to 44 year old Medi-Cal women subject to managed care.  For
example, Baker et al. show that in Alameda county, the fraction of 15 to 44 year old Medi-Cal
women who were in managed care rose from 60 to 70 percent between 1998 and 2000. 
However, the fraction of Medi-Cal deliveries that were in aid categories subject to mandatory
managed care in Alameda  fell from 63% to 48% over the same two year interval (Rains, 2000).  
Still, variations in both series after the implementation of MMC are smaller than the
sharp jump that occurred when MMC was implemented, suggesting that the Baker et al. measure
could capture large changes associated with the introduction of MMC.  For example, if there are
large changes in utilization but more subtle changes in outcomes, then the use of a noisy measure
of MMC impact could capture changes in utilization but obscure changes in outcomes.  In any
case, Baker et al. conclude that the adoption of MMC did not reduce Medicaid spending, and
may have increased it.  They also find some differences in the utilization of health services after
the adoption of MMC, including, for example, increases in access to high-level NICUs among
low birth weight infants, and conclude that MMC may have improved outcomes among low
birthweight infants.
Finally, in work in progress, Barham, Gertler, and Raube (2003) examine the impact of
MMC in California using the California natality data.  They do distinguish between COHS
counties and Two-Plan counties, and attempt to control for unobserved characteristics of the
MMC moms by using a difference-in-difference-in-differences design.  In COHS counties, they
compare the before/after MMC change in outcomes among Medi-Cal mothers to the change in14
outcomes among self-pay (uninsured) mothers.   A problem with this procedure is that there are
very few self-pay mothers over this time period.  In Two-Plan counties, they compare the change
in outcomes among Medi-Cal mothers to the change in outcomes among privately insured
mothers.   
However, if selection into MMCs is important, then neither the uninsured nor the
privately insured are valid control groups, because the composition of these groups will be
affected by a womans’ decisions to enroll or not to enroll in Medi-Cal.  Moreover, if the
introduction of Two Plan or GMC systems affected health care for non-Medi-Cal women, then
this will also invalidate the use of the non-Medi-Cal women as controls.  In contrast, in our
mother fixed effects design, each woman serves as her own control.
Our study design overcomes many of the limitations of previous work.  By following the
same mothers over time and examining changes in the enrollment patterns, utilization of care,
and birth outcomes of mothers who became subject to different types of MMC, we will be better
able to isolate the effects of these plans.   By focusing on the population that was actually subject
to MMC, we avoid drawing inferences about its effects from large numbers of women who were
not required to enroll.   And by merging data from several sources, we are able to examine a
wide range of outcomes, and to judge whether the estimated effects are consistent across these
outcomes.
2. Data
The main sources of information on birth outcomes are the California Birth Statistical
Master File 1990-2000, and the Birth Cohort files for the same period.  Both files have10 We estimate linear probability models for the probability of neonatal death controlling
for the following maternal characteristics (all dummies): black, white, hispanic, asian, other race, teen
mom, mom 20-29, mom 30-34, mom 35+, < high school, high school, some college, college or more,
single, foreign-born, no pregnancy complications; the following child characteristics: first born, lbw,
vlbw, twin, male, and the year.   We then take the residuals from these regressions and aggregate them to
the hospital level.  This procedure identifies hospitals that were good or bad on average over the period,
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information about all of the births in California over the period, drawn from individual birth
records.  These files have maternal age, education, marital status, race/ethnicity, parity, county
and zip code of residence, whether or not the delivery was paid for by Medicaid or a private
payer, and a hospital code.   In addition, they report outcomes including birth weight, as well as
information about some procedures of labor and delivery.  The Master file has confidential
information including the mother’s name and birth date, which has enabled us to link records for
siblings, which allows us to estimate models with mother fixed effects.  The Birth Cohort files
link birth and death certificates.  Hence, by using the common information about births in the
Master files and the Birth Cohort files, we have created a longitudinal data base that has
information about both births and deaths.  
Information about the type of neo-natal intensive care unit (NICU) available in each
hospital was generously supplied by Cairan Phibbs.  In addition, we have generated hospital-
level information from the Vital Statistics records about the neo-natal infant mortality rate (i.e.
deaths in the first 28 days divided by the number of births).  We focus on neo-natal mortality as
it is arguably more likely to be affected by hospital quality and the type of medical care received
than infant mortality (death in the first year) which could reflect factors such as SIDS (Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome) and accidental deaths.   Since hospital-level mortality rates are likely to
vary with the patient case-mix,  we focus on “case-mix adjusted” neonatal mortality rates from
residuals of regressions of the rates on maternal and child characteristics.
10so that we can interpret our estimates as the effect of shifting between hospitals of different average
quality.
11 We dropped Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Colusa, Del Norte, Glenn, Inyo, Lassen,
Mariposa, Modoc, Mono, Plumas, Sierra, Siskiyou, and Trinity counties.
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We start with data about 5,535,538 births.   We dropped data from the 15 smallest
counties, since these are very rural, and not at risk for managed care adoption.
11  We also
dropped multiple births, since these have a much higher incidence of negative outcomes, and
differences in outcomes between multiples cannot be due to changes in the managed care
environment.
The first two columns of Table 2a show sample statistics from a random 30 percent
sample of this group of births in 1990, and 2000.   The Table shows that about 40 percent of all
deliveries in the state were covered by Medicaid, and this fraction was relatively constant over
time.    The data suggest some broad changes in the characteristics of hospitals delivering babies
over time:   There was a small increase in the fraction of infants born in hospitals with a NICU
(neo-natal intensive care unit) of level 3 or higher, and the size of the average hospital where
women delivered also fell appreciably.  The increase in access to high-level NICUs might be
expected to improve outcomes, while the shift away from large hospitals might in fact lead to a
deterioration in infant health–while larger hospitals are not necessarily pleasant places to deliver,
they are typically well equipped to handle emergencies and difficult cases, and there is a great
deal of evidence that hospitals that perform more of any given medical procedure have better
patient outcomes than those with smaller volumes.
Raw hospital-level neonatal death rates (i.e. deaths in the first month of life) decline from
about 4.5 per 1,000 to 3.7 per 1,000.    The comparison of the 1990 and 2000 caseload adjusted17
rates suggest that over time, births shifted to better hospitals, in terms of neonatal mortality rates. 
Note that we set rates for hospitals with fewer than 500 births per year to missing, in order to
avoid unreliable rate calculations for small cells.
Turning to prenatal care, the state saw a  large  improvement in the fraction of women
beginning prenatal care in the first trimester.  This is an important indicator of the quality of
prenatal care, and is also an indicator of the ease with which the newly pregnant women can get
access to care.  On the other hand, there was a large (relative to baseline) increase in the
probability that an infant was transferred to another hospital after delivery.  A higher rate of
transfers can be regarded as a failure of prenatal care, since ideally, high risk infants should be
identified before birth so that their mothers can be directed to hospitals with the necessary
facilities.  Infants who are transferred face a much higher risk of death than infants born into
high tech hospitals to begin with.
Delivery care became more high-tech over time, with a doubling of the probability that
labor was induced or stimulated, and a 37 percent increase in the use of fetal monitors. 
However, the use of Cesarian sections increased only 3.6 percent, perhaps because of efforts by
hospitals and health insurers to monitor unnecessary use of this procedure.  It is not clear
whether these changes would be expected to lead to any improvement in average infant
outcomes, because many of these procedures may be medically unnecessary, and conducted
more for the convenience of the mother or doctor than for the benefit of the infant.  However,
more intensive care during delivery would be expected to be associated with higher costs.
Consistent with other research, there was little state-wide trend in the incidence of low
birth weight (defined as birth weight less than 2,500 grams), a widely used indicator of the health18
of the infant at birth.  Nor is there much trend in the incidence of short gestation (gestation less
than or equal to 258 days).   This can be contrasted with the decline in the probability of neonatal
death.   The fact that the underlying health of infants delivered was stable, while the probability
of death declined suggests that the decline was due to interventions at the time of delivery and in
the first month.   Thus, to the extent that the change to MMC affected the quality of hospital
used, it could have a large impact on mortality.
The next two columns provide a comparison with our “analysis sample” of 255,000
births.  This sample consists of all births to native-born, unmarried women with high school or
less, who had two or more singleton births over our sample period.  These women had a much
higher than average probability of having a Medicaid delivery, although this probability fell by
approximately 8 percentage points over time.  Conversely, it is striking to note that even in this
very disadvantaged group, 19 percent had private insurance for delivery, and that this proportion
had increased to 27 percent by 2000.
The data on hospital characteristics show that the analysis sample’s probability of
delivering in a hospital with an advanced NICU started much lower, but converged towards that
of the whole sample.   Our sample women also tended to deliver in somewhat smaller hospitals
than average.   The data on neonatal mortality rates indicate that sample women moved to
hospitals with lower raw death rates over time, but at a slower rate than among other women.  
It is striking that in contrast to the overall trends, the analysis sample showed a decrease
in the incidence of low birth weight and short gestation over time.   These means reflect the way
that the sample is selected.  For example, Table 2b, which shows means for the control variables
that we include in our regressions, indicates that there are virtually no first born children in the19
analysis sample in 2000.  This is because women had to have two or more children in order to be
included.  This criteria affects the rate of low birth weight and short gestation because first born
children tend to be at higher risk.   For similar reasons, in 2000 women in our analysis sample
are older than the average mother, and much less likely to be teenage mothers.   It is striking that
neonatal mortality also falls, but much less than in the overall population.
The fifth column Table 2a shows the number of mothers experiencing a change in the
outcome variable in question during the sample period.  This information is important given that
models that include mother fixed effects are identified by these changers.  For all but very rare
outcomes, such as transfers and deaths, there is a large sample with changes.  The last column
shows the mean change.  If equal numbers experienced positive and negative changes in these
largely dichotomous variables, then the mean would be zero.  A positive number indicates that
on average mothers moved from zero to one.  These means indicate that for all our variables of
interest, there are many changes in either direction.  
Table 2b indicates that the analysis sample is more likely to be African-American than
the whole sample.   The restriction to native-born mothers reduces the proportion of Hispanics
slightly, though it is still 50 percent in 2000.  The greatest effect of this restriction appears to be
the elimination of most Asian mothers.
The last three columns of Table 2b show changes in the characteristics of women
delivering in the sample as a whole, over the 1990 to 2000 period, by whether the county
eventually adopted COHS, Two-Plan/GMC, or no MMC.  These columns suggest that the
populations of women giving birth were evolving somewhat differently in the three types of
counties.  For example, the fraction of women who were black or Hispanic grew more rapidly in20
the Two-Plan/GMC counties than in the other types of counties, as did the fraction of mothers
with less than a high school education, and the fraction of single mothers.  Given these changes
in the characteristics of mothers, we might expect outcomes to deteriorate in Two-Plan GMC
counties relative to other counties.   Thus, the Table illustrates the importance of controlling
adequately for maternal characteristics when assessing the effect of MMC.
3. Methods
We estimate models of the following form:
(1) Outcomeit = b0 + b1Xit + b2yeart + b3COHSt + b42Plan/GMCt + b5county_trendt + b6FE + eit,
where Outcome is one of the variables listed in the first 5 panels of Table 2a, X is the vector of
maternal and child characteristics included in Table 2b, year is a vector of year dummies, and
county_trend is a county-specific time trend which accounts for under-lying trends in the
variables that we consider.  Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level in order to
account for factors that might affect all the observations in a particular county and year.  
FE refers to a vector of fixed effects, and we estimate two versions of (1) which include
different types of fixed effects.   The first model controls only for county level fixed effects. 
This model is in the same spirit as earlier work that has controlled for county fixed effects.  The
second model includes mother-specific fixed effects, which has not been done before.  These
models control for unobserved characteristics associated with the same mother, and identify the
effects of MMC by using mothers who became subject to it between pregnancies.  These models21
can be compared to those that control only for county fixed effects in order to guage the
importance of controlling for unobserved characteristics of mothers.
In models of the form (1) we look at the effect of implementing MMC on the entire
analysis sample of disadvantaged women.  However, it is possible that the effects differ for those
on Medi-Cal and those who are not.  In particular, we may be concerned that MMC will cause
reductions in the ability of safety net producers to serve uninsured women in Two Plan and
GMC counties, as discussed above.   Hence, we estimate a second set of models of the following
form:
(2) Outcomeit = b0 + b1Xit + b2yeart + b3COHSt + b42Plan/GMCt +  b5MediCalit + 
b6MediCalit*COHSt + b7MediCalit*2Plan/GMCt + b8county_trendt + b6FE + eit,
where the other variables are defined as above (except that we do not use insurance coverage as
an outcome), and MediCal is whether or not the woman’s delivery was covered by Medi-Cal.
Note that these fixed effects estimates are likely to be biased towards zero by random
measurement error (caused, for example, by different nurses recording things more or less
carefully, or by different hospital reporting practices).  On the other hand, to the extent that
measurement errors are associated with maternal reporting, and such reporting is constant over
time, including fixed effects could help to deal with such errors and increase the precision of our
estimates.
In addition to these basic models, we report the results of several specification checks. 
First, we re-estimate all of our models using less educated, native-born married women.  While22
these women may be quite similar to our sample mothers in many respects, they are highly
unlikely to be on welfare, and thus quite unlikely to be subject to MMC.  As we show below,
county MMC adoption had no impact on these mothers.
Secondly, mothers may experience a change in MMC either because they change
counties, or because the law changed in the county that they were in.   This observation raises the
possibility that mobility between counties could be affected by the MMC environment.   (Note
that MMC status is determined by county of residence, not county of delivery, so we focus on
county of residence).  In order to deal with this possibility, we also estimate models in which we
use the MMC environment the mother would have experienced had she remained in the county
in which we first observe her, and ignore subsequent moves.   While the county of the first (in
our sample) birth is also a choice, factors influencing this choice can be controlled for via the
inclusion of mother fixed effects.  As we show below, this change also has no effect on our
findings.
Thirdly, readers may be concerned that the estimated effects of MMC reflect a time trend
of some kind, given that the MMC indicators turn “on” over time but generally do not turn “off”. 
 We approach this problem in two ways.  The first is to examine only counties that eventually
adopted MMC, and adopt a “regression discontinuity design” in which we eliminate any births
that occurred more than three years before adoption, or more than three years after adoption.  In
this design the effect of MMC is identified by changes between births that took place over a
relatively short interval, so the estimated effects are unlikely to be driven by trends.   While this
reduces our sample size considerably, it generally strengthens our results as shown below.
Secondly, we added interactions between a time trend and indicators for whether the23
mother was black, hispanic, teen-aged, aged 20 to 29, aged 30 to 39, or had less than a high
school education.   If, for example, blacks were more likely than others to be subject to MMC,
and the coefficient on “black” in the outcome equations was changing over time, then these
trends would help to pick up any spurious correlation between MMC and outcomes that could
result.  However, since the results of this exercise produced estimates very similar to those
shown below, we do not report them.
Finally, some readers may be concerned that the adoption of MMC was not really an
exogenous event, since some counties took actions that were not in the original state plan.  In
particular, Napa and Monterey adopted COHS even though they were not mandated to do so.  
We have estimated alternative “intent-to-treat” models in which we assign MMC status on the
basis of the state’s planning document and ignore deviations.  That is, we treat Napa and
Monterey as though they never adopted COHS.  Since Napa and Monterey are relatively small
counties (as shown in Table 1) this has little impact on our estimates, and we do not report this
specification below.
4.  Results
a) Effects on Insurance Coverage
We begin the empirical analysis by asking whether the imposition of MMC had any
effect on the probability that a woman was enrolled in Medi-Cal for the delivery.  Note that very
few women were uninsured at delivery during the 1990s, so if women did not have Medi-Cal,
then they generally had private health insurance.  One might expect that in our very
disadvantaged population, the scope for leaving Medi-Cal and gaining private coverage would12 We have estimated similar models for Medicaid coverage of prenatal care, and private
coverage of prenatal care (since coverage of prenatal and delivery care are distinguished on the
California birth certificate).   The results were similar although slightly stronger for prenatal care
than for deliveries.   
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be rather small.   Still, the estimated effects of MMC implementation on insurance coverage
shown in Table 3 indicate that in 2Plan/GMC counties, women were 3 percent less likely to have
Medicaid covered deliveries, and 3 percent more likely to have privately covered deliveries
following the implementation of MMC.   The results are virtually identical when mother fixed
effects are included.   Although Table 1 indicated that a sizeable fraction of these mothers did
have private coverage, it is possible that these estimates are contaminated by reporting bias.  For
example, if the private MMC plan is Blue Cross, then perhaps women or providers identify the
payor as a private plan rather than as Medi-Cal.
The second panel of Table 3 offers another look at the selection issue by asking whether
the characteristics of mothers on Medi-Cal change after the implementation of MMC.  Columns
(1) and (2) show that Hispanic women became less likely to be covered by Medi-Cal following
the introduction of MMC, especially in COHS counties, while black women became more likely
to be covered in COHS counties.    On average, black women tend to have poorer birth outcomes
than similar whites, while Hispanic women tend to have better birth outcomes.  On the whole
then, the second half of Table 3 suggests that the Medi-Cal caseload became more negatively
selected, in that the women covered by Medi-Cal after the implementation of MMC were more
likely to have bad birth outcomes.  Hence, these results emphasize the importance of adequately
controlling for maternal characteristics when examining the effects of MMC.
12  25
b) Effects on Prenatal Care, Hospital Quality, Delivery Care, and Outcomes
Table 4 explores the effect of MMC on prenatal care, hospital quality, delivery care and
outcomes.   Panel A shows county-fixed effects models, while mother-fixed effects models are
shown in Panel B.  In general, the addition of mother fixed effects reduces the estimated effects
somewhat (an exception is fetal monitoring, where the Panel B coefficient for COHS counties
greatly exceeds the equivalent coefficient in Panel A).  In what follows, we will therefore focus
on the mother fixed effects models.
Perhaps surprisingly, in view of the state’s goals and the idea that managed care
organizations promote preventive care, MMC implementation was associated with large
decreases in the probability that disadvantaged women started prenatal care in the first trimester.  
 The estimates suggest that this probability declined by 4 to 6 percentage points in both COHS
and 2Plan/GMC counties.  It is remarkable that the decline occurred against the backdrop of 
large overall increases in the early initiation of prenatal care as documented in Table 2a.   COHS
counties also experienced increases in the fraction of infants transferred, which remain
marginally statistically significant (t=1.93) when mother fixed effects are added to the model. 
The next three columns of Table 4 explore the effects of MMC on hospital quality. 
Column (3) shows an 11.2 percentage point increase in the probability that disadvantaged
women in COHS counties delivered in a hospital with a high-level NICU, as well as a shifting of
these women towards delivery in larger hospitals.   It is interesting to contrast this result with
that for transfers: If there is both an increase in the number of women going to hospitals with
NICUs, and an increase in the number of infants being transferred in the COHS counties, then
this suggests that the “wrong” women are going to the hospitals with NICUs, which is13 Similarly, Duggan’s (2000) work on the way that hospitals reacted to the incentives
provided by the federal “disproportionate share” program suggests that public hospitals did not
respond to these incentives while private hospitals did.
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inefficient.  
In 2Plan/GMC counties, there were no gains in NICU availability, and a smaller increase
in the size of hospitals used for deliveries.  Perhaps more importantly, in 2Plan/GMC counties
disadvantaged women were shifted to hospitals with higher residual neonatal mortality rates,
indicating hospitals of worse quality.
Columns (6) through (8) examine effects of MMC on delivery care.  The estimates
indicate that MMC had no effect on the probability of Cesarian delivery, but was associated with
a shift towards higher-tech births in COHS counties: In these counties, the use of
induction/stimulation of labor increased by 3.9 percentage points, and the use of fetal monitors
increased by 11.9 percentage points following the introduction of MMC.  In contrast, in
2Plan/GMC counties, there was a slight decline in the use of fetal monitors.  As discussed above,
it is not clear what implications these findings are likely to have for infant health, but the
increased intensity of delivery services in COHS counties could well have increased costs.  It is
possible that these predominantly public-sector plans were under less pressure to cut costs than
the private sector managed care organizations involved in the 2Plan/GMC counties.
13
Finally, the last three columns of Table 4 indicate that the incidence of low birth weight,
short gestation, and neonatal death all increased among Medi-Cal women following the
introduction of MMC.  Moreover, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effects were
similar in COHS and 2Plan/GMC counties.   Changes in the incidence of low birth weight and
short gestation likely reflect inadequacies in prenatal care, while changes in the neonatal death14 There is some controversy about whether it is possible for prenatal care to affect the
incidence of short gestation.  On the one hand, until very recently, there were no known medical
interventions that could affect the incidence of prematurity.  On the other hand, factors such as
infections, poor diet, and smoking are all thought to contribute to prematurity, so that holistic
care that emphasized better health habits could have an impact.
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rate reflect the effects of prenatal care as well as care that is received during and after the
delivery.
14  
In summary, Table 4 shows that MMC implementation was associated with reductions in
the quality of prenatal care.  There were some potentially off-setting improvements in hospital
quality in COHS counties, as well as an increase in high-tech delivery care to Medi-Cal mothers
in these counties which is likely to have increased costs.  However, infant health outcomes
deteriorated in both COHS and 2Plan/GMC counties, to a roughly equal extent.
c) Interacting Medi-Cal Delivery with MMC Implementation
Table 5 shows estimates of model (2), in which Medi-Cal status is interacted with the
dummy variables for MMC implementation.   Table 2a showed that over 70% of our sample of
disadvantaged women had Medi-Cal deliveries, so it may be difficult to separately identify
effects on Medi-Cal and non-Medi-Cal women.  However, it is interesting to ask whether MMC
did actually have effects on non-Medi-Cal women in 2Plan/GMC counties, as its critics allege.   
Table 5 indicates, for example, that in COHS counties, declines in the probability of
beginning prenatal care in the first trimester were concentrated among Medi-Cal women, while
in 2Plan/GMC counties, both Medi-Cal and non-Medi-Cal women experienced roughly equal
declines.  We interpret this finding as evidence that MMC did have a negative impact on non-
Medi-Cal women in 2Plan/GMC counties.   Presumably, this occurred in 2Plan/GMC counties28
but not in COHS counties, because the traditional safety-net providers organized into the COHS
plans were not harmed by a diversion of revenues to private Medi-Cal contractors. 
However, an alternative, “difference-in-differences” interpretation would be that prenatal
care declined among Medi-Cal women in COHS counties, but that in 2Plan/GMC counties,
prenatal care use was declining among sample women for reasons unrelated to MMC.  In this
difference-in-difference framework, it would appear then, that COHS caused declines in prenatal
care utilization, while 2Plan/GMC did not.  We reject this alternative interpretation for several
reasons:  First, as discussed above,  MMC may have affected non-Medi-Cal women in
2Plan/GMC counties; second, trends in prenatal care utilization were strongly positive, even in
our disadvantaged sample, as shown in Table 2a; third, as we will show below, the introduction
of MMC had no impact on less educated, married, native-born women in 2Plan/GMC counties,
who were unlikely to be subject to it.  Hence, it seems unlikely that we are confusing an
underlying trend in prenatal care utilization in 2Plan/GMC counties with the effects of
2Plan/GMC utilization.
Table 5 indicates that in general the effects of MMC were the same for both Medi-Cal
and non-Medi-Cal mothers in 2Plan/GMC counties.  The one exception is for high-level NICUs,
where the Medi-Cal mothers experience no significant change, while the non-Medi-Cal mothers
experience a decline in access.  In the COHS counties, it is somewhat easier to distinguish
between Medi-Cal and other mothers.  It is the Medi-Cal mothers in COHS counties who
experience declines in prenatal care, increases in access to high-level NICUs, and increases in
the use of fetal monitoring.  They are, however, less likely than other mothers to shift to large
hospitals which might offset the other gains in hospital quality.15 Recall that in 2000, 11.6% of Medi-Cal deliveries were not subject to MMC because
the women were eligible due to low-income only.  Births to married, less-educated, native-born
women constituted only 3.4% of the Medi-Cal caseload in 2000, so in principal, all of these
women could have been in this non-MMC category.
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The last three columns of Table 5 indicate that these interactive models are not
particularly informative about the effects of MMC on infant health outcomes, since the
coefficients are not precisely estimated.  However, the t-statistics shown at the bottom of the
table indicate significant increases in low birth weight, short gestation, and neonatal death for
Medi-Cal mothers in both COHS and 2Plan/GMC counties. 
d) Specification Checks
Table 6 presents three sets of alternative estimates.  Panel A shows estimates using
married (rather than single) native-born less-educated women.   These women have a much
lower probability of being subject to MMC than the single women that we focus on.   In the state
as a whole in 2000, 65% of deliveries to native-born, less educated, single women were covered
by Medi-Cal, while the comparable figure for similar married women was 28%.  Moreover,
because married women are generally not eligible for welfare, the married women would have
been much more likely to be in an aid category that was not subject to MMC.
15   On the other
hand, if our estimates were picking up a trend among less-educated women, then one would
expect the trend to show up here also.  Table 6 shows, however, that MMC had no effect on this
sample of women.  We have also estimated models for married, native-born women with more
than a high school education, with similar results.
The second panel of Table 6 presents estimates in which the woman’s MMC status is30
calculated using her initial county of residence only.  As discussed above, these estimates are
purged of any bias due to endogenous mobility, at the cost of introducing some measurement
error in MMC status.  The results are remarkably similar to those shown in Table 4, except that
the COHS coefficient on induction/stimulation of labor becomes statistically insignificant, and
the MMC coefficients in the models of short gestation and neonatal death are now significant at
the 90% rather than the 95% level of confidence.
Panel C presents estimates based on births that occurred within plus or minus 3 years of
MMC implementation.  In these models, the MMC coefficients are identified using the sample of
women who had one birth just prior to MMC implementation, and one birth just afterwards. 
Although the sample size is considerably reduced by this procedure, the estimates remain
qualitatively similar, and in most cases the point estimates are larger–for example, the estimated
effects of COHS on transfers gains in both size and statistical significance.   Standard errors also
increase, however, with the result that the estimated effects of COHS on infant outcomes are no
longer statistically significant, although 2Plan/GMC is still estimated to increase low birth
weight, short gestation, and neonatal death (the t-statistics are 1.83, 2.00, and 1.81, respectively),
and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficient estimates in the two types of
counties.  
Finally, as discussed above, we added interactions between a time trend and indicators
for whether the mother was black, hispanic, teen-aged, aged 20 to 29, aged 30 to 39, or had less
than a high school education.   However, since the results of this exercise produced estimates16 We also estimated models including interactions of mother and county fixed effects. 
These models are identified using mothers who stayed in the same county and experienced a
change in MMC regime.  The results were the same as those reported above with the important
exception that the MMC variables were no longer jointly significant at the 90% level of
confidence in the models for neonatal mortality.  Since the point estimates are stable, we believe
that this loss of statistical significance is a reflection of the smaller effective sample size, and the
fact that neonatal mortality is a rare outcome.
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very similar to those shown in Table 4, we do not report them.
16
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Our estimates suggest that the introduction of MMC was associated with increases in the
incidence of low birth weight, short gestation, and neonatal death among the population of very
disadvantaged women who were subject to the law.  These deteriorations in infant health
occurred despite a generally stable or improving picture in the state as a whole, and are quite
robust to changes in specification.    
Our estimates point to declines in access to prenatal care as a potential reason for the
negative results.  In COHS counties, the quality of hospitals where women delivered, and the
intensity of delivery care increased, but apparently not enough to offset the other negative effects
of MMC.  In 2Plan/GMC counties, declines in access to prenatal care were reinforced by a
shifting of disadvantaged women to hospitals of worse quality.  
These results suggest that despite its well-documented failings, the old, competitive, fee-
for-service system with many atomistic providers of Medi-Cal services provided care that was
better in many respects than either MMC system.  Moreover, attempts to legislate competition by
mandating the participation of two or more providers did not improve matters, indicating that
some other method must be found to increase the quality of services rendered to Medicaid32
recipients in mandatory managed care plans.  Finally, it is interesting to speculate on the extent
to which these results might also apply to private managed care patients, who also often have
little choice of health care provider.
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#4, 2001, 751-771.Table 1: The Adoption of Medicaid Managed Care
2000, Percent
Date Enrollment Median HH
County Type Began Private Plan # births, 2000 Income, 1999
Santa Barbara COHS Sep-83 5601 46,677
San Mateo COHS Dec-87 10343 70,819
Solano COHS May-94 5831 54,099
Orange COHS Oct-95 46654 58,820
Santa Cruz COHS Jan-96 3382 53,998
Napa COHS Mar-98 1474 51,738
Monterey COHS Oct-99 6835 48,305
Average for COHS: 11,446 54,922
Sacramento GMC Apr-94 100% 17987 43,816
Alameda 2-Plan Jan-96 27.80% 21825 55,946
San Joaquin 2-Plan Feb-96 19.60% 9515 41,282
Kern 2-Plan Jul-96 36.20% 11542 35,446
San Bernardino 2-Plan Sep-96 23.40% 28329 42,066
Riverside 2-Plan Sep-96 23.60% 24633 42,887
Santa Clara 2-Plan Oct-96 38.40% 27388 74,335
Fresno 2-Plan Nov-96 18.00% 14141 34,725
San Francisco 2-Plan Jul-96 39.00% 8525 55,221
Contra Costa 2-Plan Feb-97 11.20% 13065 63,675
Los Angeles 2-Plan Apr-97 39.90% 156006 42,189
Stanislaus 2-Plan Oct-97 42.00% 7200 40,101
San Diego GMC Jul-98 100% 43759 47,067
Tulare 2-Plan Feb-99 11.50% 7194 33,983
Average for 2Plan/GMC: 27,936 46,624
Avg. for 22 included counties that did not adopt: 1089 41,859
Avg. for 15 counties excluded from our sample: 187 35,324
Notes: Counties that did not adopt, but are included in our sample include: Butte, El Dorado,
Humboldt, Imperial, Kings, Lake, Madera, Marin, Mendocino, Merced, Nevada, Placer, San Benito
San Luis Obispo, Shasta, Sonoma, Sutter, Tehema, Tuolumne, Ventura, Yuba & Yolo.  Yolo county
implemented a managed care plan in 2001.  Percent enrollments are for July 2000, except 
for Stanislaus county where the commercial plan ended in March 2000, so we use enrollments
for July 1999.
Source: Klein and Donaldson, 2002 and authors' tabulations from Vital Statistics and 2000 U.S. Census.Table 2a: Mean Outcomes for All Births and for Analysis Sample
# Mothers
All All Sample Sample with any Mean
Insurance Coverage 1990 2000 1990 2000 Changes Change
Medicaid for Delivery 0.389 0.404 0.775 0.697 39131 -0.064
Private Ins. for Delivery 0.518 0.553 0.191 0.271 36370 0.097
Hospital Characteristics
Level 3 or higher NICU 0.484 0.529 0.430 0.517 47260 0.077
# Births 3607 2867 3308 2724 198064 -195
Neonatal Mort. Rate*100 0.449 0.372 0.458 0.413 196786 -0.015
Adjusted NMR*100 0.009 -0.005 0.001 -0.006 89606 -0.002
Prenatal Care
Began in 1st Trimester 0.722 0.834 0.553 0.704 62714 0.051
InfantTransferred 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006 1845 0.107
Delivery Care
Induction/Stimulation Labor 0.107 0.212 0.089 0.176 45768 0.035
Fetal Monitor 0.488 0.668 0.458 0.644 60753 0.161
Cesarian 0.221 0.229 0.201 0.211 23675 0.073
Infant Outcomes
Low Birth Weight 0.052 0.055 0.078 0.061 18512 -0.058
Gestation < 37 weeks 0.095 0.097 0.135 0.127 31332 0.035
Neonatal Death*100 0.424 0.344 0.313 0.301 1222 0.026
Mother Chronic Condition 0.024 0.032 0.015 0.025 6090 0.178
Notes: "All" is a 30% sample of singleton births excluding the 15 counties with the fewest births in 2000 
The analysis sample is all native born mothers with >=2 births in the sample, who had <=highschool, & who
were unmarried at each point at which they were observed.Table 2b: Means of Mother/Child Characteristics for Full Sample, and Analysis Sample
All All All
1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000
All All Sample Sample Change in  Change in Change in
1990 2000 1990 2000 COHS 2Plan/GMC No MMC
Black 0.079 0.065 0.296 0.237 0.017 0.044 0.009
White 0.416 0.321 0.321 0.241 0.061 0.027 0.066
Hispanic 0.408 0.490 0.367 0.500 -0.024 -0.016 -0.064
Asian 0.060 0.081 0.002 0.006 -0.037 -0.040 -0.006
Mother < High School 0.339 0.297 0.530 0.409 0.101 0.145 0.105
Mother High School 0.313 0.287 0.470 0.591 0.061 0.043 0.056
Mother Some College 0.195 0.200 0 0 -0.041 -0.076 -0.058
Foreign Born 0.413 0.456 0 0 -0.045 -0.024 -0.041
Mother Single 0.304 0.324 1 1 0.159 0.223 0.157
Teen Mother 0.114 0.105 0.417 0.123 0.042 0.060 0.043
Mother 20-29 0.561 0.494 0.511 0.716 0.105 0.062 0.057
Mother 30-34 0.219 0.241 0.060 0.112 -0.062 -0.053 -0.037
Child First Born 0.401 0.386 0.461 0.002 0.038 0.012 0.008
Child Male 0.513 0.512 0.511 0.512 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
#Obs 175564 155112 25945 17762
See Table 2a notes.Table 3: Effect of MMC on Enrollments in Medi-Cal/Private Insurance
[1] [2] [3] [4]
MediCal MediCal Private Private
Delivery Delivery Delivery Delivery
County FE yes no yes no
Mother FE no yes no yes
Panel A
COHS -0.026 -0.01 0.015 0.017
[0.017] [0.023] [0.019] [0.021]
2Plan/GMC -0.027 -0.025 0.026 0.023
[0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
#Obs. 255018 255018 255018 255018
R-squared 0.060 0.7 0.070 0.71
Test COHS=2Plan/ 10.21 8.06 11.27 7.21
  GMC=0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Test COHS=2Plan/GMC 0.01 0.44 0.34 0.07
0.034 0.506 0.558 0.785
Panel B: Mother Fixed Effects Models of Prob(Medi-Cal Delivery)
Include Interactions of Indicated Maternal Characteristics with MMC
     Characteristic: Chronic Hispanic Black
COHS*Characteristic 0.03 -0.065 0.048
[0.032] [0.022]** [0.023]*
2Plan/GMC* -0.003 -0.024 0.011
  Characteristic [0.020] [0.008]** [0.008]
COHS -0.011 0.022 -0.016
[0.023] [0.026] [0.021]
2Plan/GMC -0.025 -0.015 -0.028
[0.006]** [0.007]* [0.007]**
Main Effect -0.023 0.004 0.012
  Characteristic [0.009]** [0.013] [.017]
#Obs. 255076 255018 255018
R-squared 0.7 0.7 0.7
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at county-year level.  P-values for F-statistics in
italics. Panel A regressions included all of the mother and child characteristics in Table 2, except 
chronic conditions.  All regressions also included year fixed effects and county-specific
time trends.  Regressions without mother fixed effects include county fixed effects.Table 4: Effects of MMC on Prenatal Care, Hospital Quality, Delivery Care and Outcomes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
Prenatal Infant Log Residual Induction Fetal Low  Birth Short Neonatal
1st tri. Transfer NICU Births NMR Stim.Labor Monitor Cesarian Weight Gestation Death
Panel A: County Fixed Effects Models
COHS -0.075 0.427 0.103 0.086 0.151 -0.006 0.016 0.019 0.022 0.022 0.295
[0.021]** [0.214]* [0.047]* [0.029]** [0.096] [0.011] [0.029] [0.012] [0.009]* [0.012] [0.206]
2Plan/GMC -0.078 0.055 0.005 0.055 0.1 -0.002 -0.025 -0.006 0.024 0.024 0.19
[0.012]** [0.064] [0.010] [0.011]** [0.040]* [0.007] [0.012]* [0.003] [0.003]** [0.006]** [0.056]**
Observations 255018 255018 255018 254953 248438 255018 255018 255018 255007 242314 255018
R-squared 0.04 0 0.19 0.25 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.01 0
Test COHS= 26.29 2.39 2.74 16.85 4.29 0.17 2.13 2.98 44.92 8.29 6.34
  2Plan/GMC=0 0.000 0.092 0.065 0.000 0.014 0.842 0.112 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.002
Test COHS= 0.02 2.75 4.01 1.03 0.25 0.08 1.62 3.82 0.02 0.01 0.25
  2Plan/GMC 0.891 0.097 0.045 0.310 0.618 0.782 0.203 0.051 0.880 0.918 0.616
Panel B: Mother Fixed Effects Models
COHS -0.058 0.327 0.112 0.094 0.088 0.039 0.119 -0.003 0.014 0.025 0.308
[0.019]** [0.169] [0.032]** [0.016]** [0.095] [0.017]* [0.037]** [0.008] [0.007]* [0.012]* [0.160]
2Plan/GMC -0.044 0.005 0.005 0.022 0.082 0.002 -0.023 0.001 0.013 0.015 0.160
[0.008]** [0.090] [0.009] [0.012] [0.034]* [0.007] [0.009]* [0.003] [0.003]** [0.007]* [0.070]*
Observations 255018 255018 255018 254953 248438 255018 255018 255018 255007 242314 255018
R-squared 0.6 0.52 0.76 0.79 0.72 0.6 0.69 0.82 0.61 0.59 0.54
Test COHS= 15.52 1.97 7.02 17.3 3.12 2.73 7.68 0.19 12.11 3.74 3.65
  2Plan/GMC=0 0.000 0.139 0.001 0.000 0.044 0.065 0.001 0.829 0.000 0.024 0.026
Test COHS= 0.58 3.59 9.64 18.79 0.00 4.55 13.36 0.31 0.02 0.73 0.86
  2Plan/GMC 0.448 0.058 0.002 0.000 0.948 0.033 0.000 0.577 0.876 0.394 0.354
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the county-year level.  P-values for F-tests in italics.  All regressions also include indicators for maternal race 
and ethnicity, maternal education, mother age, whether the child was first born, and whether the child was male as well as year dummies and county-specific time 
trends.  Coefficients and standard errors on hospital death rates are multiplied by 1,000.  Coefficients and standard errors on transfers and neonatal death are multiplied 
by 100.Table 5: Effects of MMC Interacted with Medi-Cal Delivery, Mother Fixed Effects Models
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
Prenatal Infant Log Residual Induction Fetal Low  Birth Short Neonatal
1st tri. Transfer NICU Births NMR Stim.Labor Monitor Cesarian Weight Gestation Death
COHS -0.029 -0.02 0.058 0.144 0.036 0.038 0.049 -0.003 0.006 0.024 0.258
[0.021] [0.272] [0.042] [0.029]** [0.104] [0.023] [0.031] [0.010] [0.008] [0.014] [0.172]
COHS -0.046 0.529 0.081 -0.076 0.106 0.001 0.108 0 0.012 0.003 0.071
  * MediCal [0.020]* [0.276] [0.026]** [0.033]* [0.172] [0.022] [0.038]** [0.010] [0.008] [0.012] [0.162]
2Plan/GMC -0.049 -0.034 -0.039 0.05 0.015 0.006 -0.003 -0.001 0.009 0.012 0.043
[0.012]** [0.104] [0.014]** [0.019]** [0.051] [0.009] [0.013] [0.004] [0.004]* [0.009] [0.110]
2Plan/GMC 0.006 0.05 0.055 -0.037 0.075 -0.006 -0.027 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.151
  * MediCal [0.010] [0.099] [0.015]** [0.020] [0.057] [0.009] [0.014] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.107]
MediCal  delivery -0.031 -0.008 -0.065 -0.011 -0.024 -0.003 -0.033 0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.077
[0.005]** [0.063] [0.011]** [0.014] [0.042] [0.005] [0.011]** [0.002]* [0.002] [0.003] [0.051]
Observations 255018 255018 255018 254953 254953 255018 255018 255018 255007 242314 255018
R-squared 0.61 0.52 0.76 0.79 0.72 0.6 0.69 0.82 0.61 0.59 0.54
Test Sum COHS 13.89 8.43 22.84 13.80 1.12 5.18 12.37 0.16 5.17 4.29 3.33
  terms=0 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.290 0.023 0.000 0.689 0.023 0.038 0.068
Test Sum 2Plan/GMC 24.81 0.03 2.58 1.00 5.49 0.00 8.22 0.33 22.55 5.02 6.97
  terms=0 0.000 0.867 0.109 0.318 0.019 0.977 0.004 0.565 0.000 0.025 0.008
Test all MMC 9.28 2.48 12.37 9.01 1.73 1.46 5.15 0.17 6.35 1.94 2.34
  terms=0 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.213 0.001 0.952 0.000 0.100 0.052
Notes: See Table 4 notes.Table 6: Specification Checks (Mother Fixed Effects Models)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Medi-Cal Prenatal Infant Log Residual Induction Fetal Low  Birth Short Neonatal
Delivery 1st tri. Transfer NICU Births NMR Stim.Labor Monitor Cesarian Weight Gestation Death
Panel A: Married Native-Born Mothers with Highschool or Less
COHS -0.001 -0.046 -0.102 0.026 0.086 0.052 0.045 0.082 -0.019 0.002 0.005 0.118
[0.036] [0.037] [0.730] [0.060] [0.073] [0.127] [0.064] [0.060] [0.028] [0.020] [0.025] [0.405]
2Plan/GMC -0.008 -0.032 0.174 -0.037 0.003 0.027 -0.003 -0.016 0.009 0.005 -0.007 0.441
[0.022] [0.025] [0.515] [0.033] [0.035] [0.123] [0.029] [0.030] [0.016] [0.014] [0.023] [0.319]
#Obs. 134023 134023 134023 134023 133998 128890 134023 134023 134023 134015 129032 134023
R-squared 0.96 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.9 0.93 0.96 0.92 0.91 0.9
Test COHS=2Plan/ 0.06 1.24 0.10 0.87 0.70 0.09 0.27 1.27 0.47 0.06 0.09 1.01
  GMC=0 0.938 0.290 0.909 0.421 0.498 0.911 0.767 0.280 0.626 0.944 0.913 0.365
Panel B: MMC Classification Based on Initial County Only
COHS -0.015 -0.059 0.205 0.103 0.080 0.108 0.024 0.096 0.000 0.014 0.017 0.258
[0.022] [0.018]** [0.179] [0.029]** [0.015]** [0.086] [0.016] [0.029]** [0.007] [0.006]* [0.010] [0.151]
2Plan/GMC -0.026 -0.044 -0.055 0.006 0.022 0.081 0.004 -0.021 0.001 0.012 0.011 0.130
[0.006]** [0.008]** [0.091] [0.009] [0.012] [0.034]* [0.007] [0.009]* [0.003] [0.003]** [0.006] [0.068]
#Obs. 255018 255018 255018 255018 254953 248438 255018 255018 255018 255007 242314 255018
R-squared 0.7 0.6 0.52 0.76 0.79 0.72 0.6 0.69 0.82 0.61 0.59 0.54
Test COHS= 7.89 17.37 1.07 7.59 13.84 3.35 1.27 7.65 0.04 10.15 2.60 2.73
  2Plan/GMC=0 0.000 0.000 0.344 0.001 0.000 0.035 0.282 0.001 0.959 0.000 0.074 0.065
Test COHS= 0.24 0.61 2.08 9.24 12.63 0.09 1.54 13.96 0.01 0.11 0.36 0.71
  2Plan/GMC 0.627 0.435 0.150 0.002 0.000 0.761 0.214 0.000 0.930 0.746 0.549 0.399
Panel C: Births Within +/- 3 years of Implementation of MMC Only
COHS -0.011 -0.083 0.761 0.079 0.102 0.087 0.006 0.128 0.003 0.016 0.039 0.208
[0.039] [0.027]** [0.338]* [0.016]** [0.025]** [0.116] [0.017] [0.056]* [0.013] [0.010] [0.028] [0.232]
2Plan/GMC -0.026 -0.042 0.002 0.012 0.042 0.136 0.000 0.006 -0.004 0.011 0.026 0.235
[0.010]** [0.014]** [0.181] [0.015] [0.014]** [0.054]* [0.008] [0.012] [0.006] [0.006] [0.013]* [0.130]
#Obs. 115035 115035 115035 115035 115018 112517 115035 115035 115035 115034 109118 115035
R-squared 0.83 0.77 0.73 0.87 0.88 0.85 0.78 0.84 0.9 0.77 0.76 0.72
Test COHS= 3.45 6.89 2.59 13.03 10.38 3.27 0.06 2.65 0.32 3.12 2.71 1.79
  2Plan/GMC=0 0.032 0.001 0.075 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.939 0.071 0.728 0.044 0.066 0.167
Test COHS= 0.15 2.59 4.49 9.74 5.24 0.17 0.12 4.70 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.01
  2Plan/GMC 0.703 0.108 0.034 0.002 0.022 0.680 0.727 0.030 0.591 0.621 0.661 0.913